game theory?

[DerWaschbar]

a butt that dont stink now we are talking un realistic

a butt that dont sit? un realistic

car with 5 wheels un realistic

car with a butt un realistic

bird with a butt for a head not realistic either

bird with a butt for a car

car with a bird for a head

i could go on...

[DerWaschbar]

one time a had a dream about somersaulting across the whole town everyone lined up cheering me on.

one mile town might be realistic

butt a dream isnt real life so thats a tricky one

[DerWaschbar]

dream with a car for a butt not real

dream with a bird for a car ive never seen but if there was a good deal on one id take it

[DerWaschbar]

when i was in high school i saw a guy with no arms play piano with his toes. he had a special car rigged up so he could drive around to schools with his feet and show off.

not a bad life.

[Friendly Foil]

was nash a console gamer? if yes then fuck him.

best answer

but not best thread.

wasch's posts were also good

in my opinion.

[hoggy]

Isn't game theory like in that episode of Star Trek?

 

[youtubehd]8srzeIAOJeI[/youtubehd]

[Goiter Sanchez]

[YangYing]

 

was nash a console gamer? if yes then fuck him.

best answer

but not best thread.

wasch's posts were also good

in my opinion.

 

this is obv not realistic

nor is that a raccoon posts in an idm forum

but that this thread is not the best is also not probably realistic

not realistically my opinion

[triachus]

I've always wanted to start a thread called "politics" with the first post just saying "amirite" and watch a shitflingfest unravel from the first 5 posts and see pages of pages of blocks of texts appear, mostly made by the same 2-4 people, half the posts ending with links to articles and .pdfs that nobody will ever read, and eventually there will be at least one post containing only five youtube vids about economical lectures all adding up to 8 hours of footage

[mcbpete]

I like the bit when russell crowe makes all the writing go shiny.

[usagi]

I've always wanted to start a thread called "politics" with the first post just saying "amirite" and watch a shitflingfest unravel from the first 5 posts and see pages of pages of blocks of texts appear, mostly made by the same 2-4 people, half the posts ending with links to articles and .pdfs that nobody will ever read, and eventually there will be at least one post containing only five youtube vids about economical lectures all adding up to 8 hours of footage

and then magically world peace

[chenGOD]

 

let's see if i can remember:

 

 

 

Firm B's output will be on the left and firm A's output will be on the right in each quadrant (since I can't do tables in the board there will be no lines, so hopefully this is clear)

 

FIRM A's OUTPUT

One-half Two-Thirds

Monopoly Monopoly

Profit Profit

 

F O One-half

I U Monopoly 20|20 15|22

R T Profit

M P

U

B' T Two-thirds

s Monopoly 22|15 17|17

Profit

 

 

Where's the Nash Equilibrium? Explain your answer, and what are the implications of a Nash equilibrium?

So, a Nash equilibrium occurs when players can no longer exploit each other. The behavior of both players will 'settle' into a Nash equilibrium.

 

Here, there is a question as to whether the two firms can comminucate beforehand, and whether there are meta-game reasons not to cooperate. But if the firms are especially unfriendly they"ll just go in circles trying to exploit each other. And since there is no way to avoid being exploited...

 

Bah I just woke up to piss and now I'm trying to solve game theory puzzles. Alright lemme think here...

 

Okay, so the 'super-rational' solution (if they were playing against a mirror) then they would both choose 'one-half'. This is also the 'cooperate' solution. What I remember about the Prisoner's Dilemma with the classic payouts was that the (paradoxical) Nash equilibrium was that they both defect, as they both then cannot be exploited. So it must be that 17/17 is the Nash equilibrium...but no because they can still be exploited, so...

 

There is no Nash equilibrium.

 

 

(I think...I dunno, I'm bloody tired)

 

Your definition of a Nash equilibrium is a little off, but if you had more faith (and also thought like a corporation), you would have had the right answer with both choosing 17.

It's not that the players can no longer be exploited in a Nash equilibrium, it's that they can obtain no greater benefit from changing their strategies assuming the other players strategy remains the same (and they have knowledge of the strategy).

In this example, if both firms cooperate and produce 1/2 monopoly output, their payoff would be 20. However, they have an incentive to cheat - if each firm thinks the other firm will cooperate (ie produce 1/2), then they can gain greater payoff by producing 2/3 monopoly output.

But if we assume that each firm believes cooperation is not possible because there is no way of enforcing the agreement (output restricting agreements tend to be illegal) then they're in a non-cooperative game - and the clear solution is they gain maximum profit by producing 2/3 monopoly output regardless of what the other firm does.

So what's the implication?

If a Nash Equilibrium is established (by whatever means) there is no incentive for any firm to change its own behaviour.

 

 

(or perhaps I should just say "that's not realistic" so I don't actually have to think about it or solve it, and instead just berate you for posing such an unrealistic problem)

 

Unfortunately for you, this is a real problem - it's how firms behave in oligopolies. It's one of the first lessons you learn in introductory micro.

[chenGOD]

I've always wanted to start a thread called "politics" with the first post just saying "amirite" and watch a shitflingfest unravel from the first 5 posts and see pages of pages of blocks of texts appear, mostly made by the same 2-4 people, half the posts ending with links to articles and .pdfs that nobody will ever read, and eventually there will be at least one post containing only five youtube vids about economical lectures all adding up to 8 hours of footage

 

Although I intensely dislike the blocks and blocks of text, I will at least take a cursory glance at any pdfs or articles that someone posts as long as they are relevant (if i was cool i would say "germane") and not written by utter lunatics (of course assuming I'm not swamped with my own reading).

 

amirite?

[YangYing]

THIS IS WHAT GAME THEORY SOUNDS LIKE

https://youtu.be/qswTb9XJTMA

[Guest Atom Dowry Firth]

My nephew plays poker for a 'living' too. Last time I played him I won. True story.

[sweepstakes]

function realistic() {
var stuff = ["balls", "balloon", "bird", "butt", "cadberry creme egg", "car", "dick", "DJ", "dream", "face", "hands", "head", "parking meter", "planet", "raccoon", "rotor", "xylophone"];

function get() {

i = Math.floor(Math.random() * stuff.length);

thing = stuff || 'ASS';

stuff = [].concat(

i ? stuff.slice(0, i - 1) : [],

i < stuff.length - 1 ? stuff.slice(i + 1) : []

);

return thing;

}

return get() + ' with a ' + get() + ' for a ' + get();
}

alert(realistic());

[YangYing]

My nephew plays poker for a 'living' too. Last time I played him I won. True story.

how do you 'play' a nephew?

 

 

sorry

 

[juiceciuj]

lol

[LimpyLoo]

 

 

let's see if i can remember:

 

 

 

Firm B's output will be on the left and firm A's output will be on the right in each quadrant (since I can't do tables in the board there will be no lines, so hopefully this is clear)

 

FIRM A's OUTPUT

One-half Two-Thirds

Monopoly Monopoly

Profit Profit

 

F O One-half

I U Monopoly 20|20 15|22

R T Profit

M P

U

B' T Two-thirds

s Monopoly 22|15 17|17

Profit

 

 

Where's the Nash Equilibrium? Explain your answer, and what are the implications of a Nash equilibrium?

So, a Nash equilibrium occurs when players can no longer exploit each other. The behavior of both players will 'settle' into a Nash equilibrium.

 

Here, there is a question as to whether the two firms can comminucate beforehand, and whether there are meta-game reasons not to cooperate. But if the firms are especially unfriendly they"ll just go in circles trying to exploit each other. And since there is no way to avoid being exploited...

 

Bah I just woke up to piss and now I'm trying to solve game theory puzzles. Alright lemme think here...

 

Okay, so the 'super-rational' solution (if they were playing against a mirror) then they would both choose 'one-half'. This is also the 'cooperate' solution. What I remember about the Prisoner's Dilemma with the classic payouts was that the (paradoxical) Nash equilibrium was that they both defect, as they both then cannot be exploited. So it must be that 17/17 is the Nash equilibrium...but no because they can still be exploited, so...

 

There is no Nash equilibrium.

 

 

(I think...I dunno, I'm bloody tired)

 

Your definition of a Nash equilibrium is a little off, but if you had more faith (and also thought like a corporation), you would have had the right answer with both choosing 17.

It's not that the players can no longer be exploited in a Nash equilibrium, it's that they can obtain no greater benefit from changing their strategies assuming the other players strategy remains the same (and they have knowledge of the strategy).

In this example, if both firms cooperate and produce 1/2 monopoly output, their payoff would be 20. However, they have an incentive to cheat - if each firm thinks the other firm will cooperate (ie produce 1/2), then they can gain greater payoff by producing 2/3 monopoly output.

But if we assume that each firm believes cooperation is not possible because there is no way of enforcing the agreement (output restricting agreements tend to be illegal) then they're in a non-cooperative game - and the clear solution is they gain maximum profit by producing 2/3 monopoly output regardless of what the other firm does.

So what's the implication?

If a Nash Equilibrium is established (by whatever means) there is no incentive for any firm to change its own behaviour.

 

 

 

 

I've been mulling over your post since I woke up. I was about to post "oops, you're right" but then I got to thinking...

 

1) Firstly, technically you may be right about the strict definition of a Nash equilibrium, but poker players think about Nash equilibriums in terms of "not being exploited" because poker is a zero-sum game, and in zero-sum games your definition and my definition have identical consequences.

 

2) Secondly, in the classic Prisoner's Dilemma, the Nash equilibrium is defect/defect because neither player can benefit from changing their behavior. However, in the Firm A/Firm B game, once they are at '17/17,' either firm can benefit from choosing '2/3 monopoly.'

 

Thus there is no Nash equilibrium. They'd just go around in circles.

[doublename]

limpy, what do you do to pay bills and buy weed?

[LimpyLoo]

limpy, what do you do to pay bills and buy weed?

 

i play poker to pay the bills

but once my rent is paid and the groceries are bought and the pillbox is full

i get lazy for the rest of the month

unless there's some gear i want or something

e.g. last month i bought an SP-303

 

and actually i smoke weed like once a year lol

i smoked a couple nights last week

and didn't bug out like i usually do

[chenGOD]

 

 

 

let's see if i can remember:

 

 

 

Firm B's output will be on the left and firm A's output will be on the right in each quadrant (since I can't do tables in the board there will be no lines, so hopefully this is clear)

 

FIRM A's OUTPUT

One-half Two-Thirds

Monopoly Monopoly

Profit Profit

 

F O One-half

I U Monopoly 20|20 15|22

R T Profit

M P

U

B' T Two-thirds

s Monopoly 22|15 17|17

Profit

 

 

Where's the Nash Equilibrium? Explain your answer, and what are the implications of a Nash equilibrium?

So, a Nash equilibrium occurs when players can no longer exploit each other. The behavior of both players will 'settle' into a Nash equilibrium.

 

Here, there is a question as to whether the two firms can comminucate beforehand, and whether there are meta-game reasons not to cooperate. But if the firms are especially unfriendly they"ll just go in circles trying to exploit each other. And since there is no way to avoid being exploited...

 

Bah I just woke up to piss and now I'm trying to solve game theory puzzles. Alright lemme think here...

 

Okay, so the 'super-rational' solution (if they were playing against a mirror) then they would both choose 'one-half'. This is also the 'cooperate' solution. What I remember about the Prisoner's Dilemma with the classic payouts was that the (paradoxical) Nash equilibrium was that they both defect, as they both then cannot be exploited. So it must be that 17/17 is the Nash equilibrium...but no because they can still be exploited, so...

 

There is no Nash equilibrium.

 

 

(I think...I dunno, I'm bloody tired)

 

Your definition of a Nash equilibrium is a little off, but if you had more faith (and also thought like a corporation), you would have had the right answer with both choosing 17.

It's not that the players can no longer be exploited in a Nash equilibrium, it's that they can obtain no greater benefit from changing their strategies assuming the other players strategy remains the same (and they have knowledge of the strategy).

In this example, if both firms cooperate and produce 1/2 monopoly output, their payoff would be 20. However, they have an incentive to cheat - if each firm thinks the other firm will cooperate (ie produce 1/2), then they can gain greater payoff by producing 2/3 monopoly output.

But if we assume that each firm believes cooperation is not possible because there is no way of enforcing the agreement (output restricting agreements tend to be illegal) then they're in a non-cooperative game - and the clear solution is they gain maximum profit by producing 2/3 monopoly output regardless of what the other firm does.

So what's the implication?

If a Nash Equilibrium is established (by whatever means) there is no incentive for any firm to change its own behaviour.

 

 

 

 

I've been mulling over your post since I woke up. I was about to post "oops, you're right" but then I got to thinking...

 

1) Firstly, technically you may be right about the strict definition of a Nash equilibrium, but poker players think about Nash equilibriums in terms of "not being exploited" because poker is a zero-sum game, and in zero-sum games your definition and my definition have identical consequences.

 

2) Secondly, in the classic Prisoner's Dilemma, the Nash equilibrium is defect/defect because neither player can benefit from changing their behavior. However, in the Firm A/Firm B game, once they are at '17/17,' either firm can benefit from choosing '2/3 monopoly.'

 

Thus there is no Nash equilibrium. They'd just go around in circles.

 

 

Errr limpy - when they're at 17/17 they are already producing 2/3 monopoly output.

 

As to your first point, sorry but you can't just change the definition of something and expect it to have the same meaning. You go look in any micro textbook or journal article and they will define a Nash Equilibrium along the lines I have.

[LimpyLoo]

 

 

 

 

let's see if i can remember:

 

 

 

Firm B's output will be on the left and firm A's output will be on the right in each quadrant (since I can't do tables in the board there will be no lines, so hopefully this is clear)

 

FIRM A's OUTPUT

One-half Two-Thirds

Monopoly Monopoly

Profit Profit

 

F O One-half

I U Monopoly 20|20 15|22

R T Profit

M P

U

B' T Two-thirds

s Monopoly 22|15 17|17

Profit

 

 

Where's the Nash Equilibrium? Explain your answer, and what are the implications of a Nash equilibrium?

So, a Nash equilibrium occurs when players can no longer exploit each other. The behavior of both players will 'settle' into a Nash equilibrium.

 

Here, there is a question as to whether the two firms can comminucate beforehand, and whether there are meta-game reasons not to cooperate. But if the firms are especially unfriendly they"ll just go in circles trying to exploit each other. And since there is no way to avoid being exploited...

 

Bah I just woke up to piss and now I'm trying to solve game theory puzzles. Alright lemme think here...

 

Okay, so the 'super-rational' solution (if they were playing against a mirror) then they would both choose 'one-half'. This is also the 'cooperate' solution. What I remember about the Prisoner's Dilemma with the classic payouts was that the (paradoxical) Nash equilibrium was that they both defect, as they both then cannot be exploited. So it must be that 17/17 is the Nash equilibrium...but no because they can still be exploited, so...

 

There is no Nash equilibrium.

 

 

(I think...I dunno, I'm bloody tired)

 

Your definition of a Nash equilibrium is a little off, but if you had more faith (and also thought like a corporation), you would have had the right answer with both choosing 17.

It's not that the players can no longer be exploited in a Nash equilibrium, it's that they can obtain no greater benefit from changing their strategies assuming the other players strategy remains the same (and they have knowledge of the strategy).

In this example, if both firms cooperate and produce 1/2 monopoly output, their payoff would be 20. However, they have an incentive to cheat - if each firm thinks the other firm will cooperate (ie produce 1/2), then they can gain greater payoff by producing 2/3 monopoly output.

But if we assume that each firm believes cooperation is not possible because there is no way of enforcing the agreement (output restricting agreements tend to be illegal) then they're in a non-cooperative game - and the clear solution is they gain maximum profit by producing 2/3 monopoly output regardless of what the other firm does.

So what's the implication?

If a Nash Equilibrium is established (by whatever means) there is no incentive for any firm to change its own behaviour.

 

 

 

 

I've been mulling over your post since I woke up. I was about to post "oops, you're right" but then I got to thinking...

 

1) Firstly, technically you may be right about the strict definition of a Nash equilibrium, but poker players think about Nash equilibriums in terms of "not being exploited" because poker is a zero-sum game, and in zero-sum games your definition and my definition have identical consequences.

 

2) Secondly, in the classic Prisoner's Dilemma, the Nash equilibrium is defect/defect because neither player can benefit from changing their behavior. However, in the Firm A/Firm B game, once they are at '17/17,' either firm can benefit from choosing '2/3 monopoly.'

 

Thus there is no Nash equilibrium. They'd just go around in circles.

 

 

Errr limpy - when they're at 17/17 they are already producing 2/3 monopoly output.

 

As to your first point, sorry but you can't just change the definition of something and expect it to have the same meaning. You go look in any micro textbook or journal article and they will define a Nash Equilibrium along the lines I have.

 

 

yeah sorry i meant either can benefit from producing '1/2 monopoly'

thus no Nash equilibrium

[mcbpete]

Game Theory ???? More like ..............

 

 

...........

..............

........

...................................

..

..........................Lame Theory !

 

#bantz 45 Fav+ 12 RT

[triachus]

Game Theory ???? More like ..............

 

 

...........

..............

........

...................................

..

..........................Lame Theory !

 

#bantz 45 Fav+ 12 RT