murphy 65
the meaning-conferring acts, meaning-intentions. ... if the object intended is general or specific, then meaning ‘arises through abstraftion, but not through abstracftion in that improper sense by which the empiricist psychology and epistemology are dominated. [LI 337].’ in contrast to the act presenting an individual, the husserlian conception of abstraction refers to ‘a new mode of apprehension constitutive of the intuitive presence of the Idea,’ eidetic intuition.
murphy 65
for generality of meaning berkely and hume substituted a general psychlogical function of association [YES, KEY]. in a psychologicall regulated way the same sign is associated with differnent individuals which appear alike. the sign thus becomes a general name with which multpile like individual objects are associated. husserl points out correctly that generality of MEANING is something entirely differnet from generality of psychologicla function. generality of meaning is an ideal moment which “belonged to the semantic essence of the individual essence as such, as an indwelling meaning-form” [LI 374]