Uploading consciousness into a computer

[Ego]

Your consciousness doesn't go from one copy to the other when one of them is destroyed, your consciousness is in both after copying and when one of them gets discarded that's the only one that goes on. The one that's frozen is just data. So you've got a 100% chance to go on. If you would resume both, you've got a 50% chance to end up in either one of them.

 

i don't see how your consciousness would be in both. i think it would definitely stay in the original.

 

the problem with your viewpoint, from how i'm understanding it, is that you're viewing the brain (and consciousness) as a static thing that can be copied. consciousness, in my opinion (because science has yet to definitively answer this question), is the sum of all the electrical activity occurring in your brain at any given point. this activity is constantly fluctuating and changing, but it's always there. it started as a chain reaction when your nervous system was developing in the womb and it's stayed there your entire life. copying it? how do you copy something that's constantly in flux? short of stopping time and meticulously replicating one's brain atom by atom, it's impossible. even detailed brain scans take time and are not an instantaneous snapshot of brain activity. not to mention the process of copying the brain...

 

and even if you somehow copy it perfectly and instantaneously, the two copies would diverge immediately, thereby creating two entirely separate conscious beings.

 

Yes, this is all under the presumption that we would be able to completely freeze the brain or do the whole operation fast enough so the brain doesn't have a chance to let neurons flow. This whole discussion is hypothetical though, the implementation is pretty much impossible. We'll probably cure cancer and find eternal youth first.

[Guest Adam]

Your consiousnes can't be in both because they both have to be related and comunicating then. Real-time comunication is impossible.

 

And hoodie, I think it's possible to copy them exacly as it is, thereotically of course. The problem still fucking stands and annoys the shit out of me.

[Hoodie]

edit: lol i just remembered the point of this thread. nvm.

[joseph]

My question was rather: Can you predict the eventual contents of your journal?

 

It's nonsensical to ask "when you split up into two different people, which one will you be?" Both were you. You'll just have to get used to non-linear identities with branching.

 

I have already acknowledged that this is correct. Please try to understand what I am actually saying.

 

I am not talking about an identity problem, I am talking about an experiential problem. Re-examine my journal question. If you keep a journal before, during, and after a copy of you is made, there will be a point in time where the contents of the two journals begin to differ, based on the differing experiences of the different copies. You cannot both consciousnesses at the same time. Each copy will have equal claim to be "you", but there will be two distinct journals corresponding to two distinct conscious people.

 

You can't experience both. You can't experience neither, because by hypothesis we have already assumed that such a digital copy is possible. It is impossible to predict which one you will experience being, even though from a 3rd-person perspective both are equally "you", and of course the 1st-person experience of the other copy will have equal "legitimacy".

 

What do you mean split up? You can't be split up.

 

That's really the crux of the situation: My subjective experience can be duplicated, but my own subjective experience cannot be split.

 

your subjective conscious experience is linked to your brain.

 

If such a digital copying process is possible, then this is not true. Your consciousness is not especially associated to any physical system: it is only information that matters.

 

You couldn't be both of them according to our laws of physics. How can they be related? You'll be one of them or none of them. The problem is which and why,

 

It is clearly unpredictable in principle.

[Guest boo]

i guess conscious delusions of what are actually just preset subconscious processes could be what defines an individual.

 

(i seem to feel like talking some bollocks today)

[cruising for burgers]

someone call karl pilkington

[joseph]

Please note that you can already consider yourself to be continuously copied and deleted (or cut and pasted) instantaneously, at every moment.

[Guest Adam]

You couldn't be both of them according to our laws of physics. How can they be related? You'll be one of them or none of them. The problem is which and why,

 

It is clearly unpredictable in principle.

 

What do you mean? This contradicts determinism which is necesarry to assume that consiousness upload is possible.

[Braintree]

at best, you're only making a copy.

 

This.

 

The program that has my consciousness would live on, but I, myself, would still die. I don't think it would really matter to me.

 

I didn't read the rest of the thread, by the way. This was probably brought up already.

[Guest Adam]

yeah...

[cruising for burgers]

A LOVE OF TWO BRAINS trailer

[youtubehd]WZG7Pg3jcWo[/youtubehd]

[Hoodie]

Please note that you can already consider yourself to be continuously copied and deleted (or cut and pasted) instantaneously, at every moment.

 

that's assuming time is a dimension, right?

[cruising for burgers]

Ctrl+V's himself

[Guest Adam]

Please note that you can already consider yourself to be continuously copied and deleted (or cut and pasted) instantaneously, at every moment.

 

that's assuming time is a dimension, right?

 

what else can you assume?

[joseph]

You couldn't be both of them according to our laws of physics. How can they be related? You'll be one of them or none of them. The problem is which and why,

 

It is clearly unpredictable in principle.

 

What do you mean? This contradicts determinism which is necesarry to assume that consiousness upload is possible.

 

It does contradict 1st person determinism, yes. I don't see how determinism is needed for the upload, except for the fact that we need classical physics (for all practical purposes) in order to make the perfect copy (only in principle of course). But that's not related to the first person indeterminism.

 

Please note that you can already consider yourself to be continuously copied and deleted (or cut and pasted) instantaneously, at every moment.

 

that's assuming time is a dimension, right?

 

It doesn't assume anything ontological about time other than that we experience it.

[Guest Rambo]

who said there would be no physical aspect?

 

So having your consciousness on some computer or in the cloud is in any way equivalent to having a body? I was assuming it isn't, tbh. Feel free to share your vision about uploading your consciousness into a computer and what sex would be like.

 

A body would be simulated and the sensations received would be simulated. That's the premise. What would a human mind be if it was without any sense organs?

[ZoeB]

My question was rather: Can you predict the eventual contents of your journal?

 

It's nonsensical to ask "when you split up into two different people, which one will you be?" Both were you. You'll just have to get used to non-linear identities with branching.

 

I have already acknowledged that this is correct. Please try to understand what I am actually saying.

 

I am not talking about an identity problem, I am talking about an experiential problem. Re-examine my journal question. If you keep a journal before, during, and after a copy of you is made, there will be a point in time where the contents of the two journals begin to differ, based on the differing experiences of the different copies. You cannot both consciousnesses at the same time. Each copy will have equal claim to be "you", but there will be two distinct journals corresponding to two distinct conscious people.

 

You can't experience both. You can't experience neither, because by hypothesis we have already assumed that such a digital copy is possible. It is impossible to predict which one you will experience being, even though from a 3rd-person perspective both are equally "you", and of course the 1st-person experience of the other copy will have equal "legitimacy".

 

It's a nonsensical question. It would only make sense if there could only be one true "you", observing everything from an outsider's perspective, using a body as a vessel, ie a soul, but that's not true. Both lifeforms would have the first person point of view of being you, because they both have your brain. You put it well in this other post:

 

Please note that you can already consider yourself to be continuously copied and deleted (or cut and pasted) instantaneously, at every moment.

 

You have no qualms about whether you of one second ago or current you is the "real" one. If two copies of you existed simultaneously, that wouldn't change this. Each person identifies herself as conscious and as being that one person, these two just happen to share memories up until a point.

 

So if I get myself backed up, and walk out of there, and think of myself as Zoë branch A, and the virtual version of me wakes up and thinks of herself as Zoë branch B, we've still both been the exact same person until that point, and it's only our new, differing stimuli and (simulated or not) chemical imbalances that make us different. From Zoë A's point of view, she's had a linear progression without interruption, and Zoë B can claim the same.

 

So yes, I can predict I would be both people. Why would that seem impossible to you? Both, from their first person point of view, would clearly remember being me, and have uninterrupted, sequential steps from being me to being them.

 

If you fall asleep, have dreams, and wake up having forgotten the dreams, you don't worry about whether the dreamer or the waking you is the real one. They're both you. It's like that, only in parallel. So:

 

You can't experience both.

 

Why not? "You" will become two different people, each one experiencing things in the first person. "You" won't be experiencing two different lives at once, because there's one of you per person, because you are a person. The mind is generated by the brain, and with two brains, you'll have two minds, each of which is equally "you".

[Guest Adam]

You can't have two minds, you can't experience both, real-time communication is impossible. If you say that you won't be experiencing two different lives at once you've already said that either you experience one of them, or none of them. That's it. You already differentiated Zoe A and Zoe B. Of course Zoe B will have the exacly same memories and all, but Zoe A won't be experiencing Zoe B.

 

 

You couldn't be both of them according to our laws of physics. How can they be related? You'll be one of them or none of them. The problem is which and why,

 

It is clearly unpredictable in principle.

 

What do you mean? This contradicts determinism which is necesarry to assume that consiousness upload is possible.

 

It does contradict 1st person determinism, yes. I don't see how determinism is needed for the upload, except for the fact that we need classical physics (for all practical purposes) in order to make the perfect copy (only in principle of course). But that's not related to the first person indeterminism.

 

Isn't determinism needed for anything to actually work lol? If determinism is false the upload is impossible because there's no way to understand if it's an upload or copy-paste-delete. I mean consciousnes upload. If you say it's unpredictable then you introduce magic don't you?

[modey]

getting some serious acid flashbacks from this thread

 

 

edit: keep it up, this is quite an amazing philosophical discussion

[azatoth]

Haven't read the whole discussion, but to me it's clear that once you upload your consciousness into a computer and the "meat you" continues to live, they are now two separate individuals. They may be identical initially but the differing experiences will differentiate them more and more, especially if the uploaded version of "you" would live in a vastly different environment than the "meat you".

What does determinism have to do with uploading consicousness? Maybe I ought to read the discussion.

[modey]

Maybe I ought to read the discussion.

I think you should!

[azatoth]

Ctrl+V's himself

 

*becomes link to porn video, forgot to Ctrl+C himself first*

[ZoeB]

You can't have two minds, you can't experience both, real-time communication is impossible. If you say that you won't be experiencing two different lives at once you've already said that either you experience one of them, or none of them. That's it. You already differentiated Zoe A and Zoe B. Of course Zoe B will have the exacly same memories and all, but Zoe A won't be experiencing Zoe B.

 

Obviously the two minds can't talk to each other, but both, as far as they're concerned, from their own subjective viewpoints, are experiencing one consistent consciousness traceable back to a common starting point (pre-fork Zoë).

 

So although "I" obviously wouldn't have two minds, there would be two minds who are equally "me."

 

When I become Zoë B, that's who I'll be, and when I become Zoë A, that's who I'll be. I'll become both. They're just unrelated and non-communicative, but I'll still be both, separately. I won't experience both. One "I" will experience only being Zoë A, while another "I" will experience only being Zoë B.

[Guest Adam]

We need to invent few new words for this.

 

You say that they both be equally you. That's correct fromt third person perspective. But, at the moment there's only one Zoe. You are feeling it from first person perspective. When someone copies your brain, Zoe B appears. You can see her from third person perspective, but from first person perspective you will be the "original" Zoe. I hope you understand what I mean here by saying "you".

[ZoeB]

We need to invent few new words for this.

 

You say that they both be equally you. That's correct fromt third person perspective. But, at the moment there's only one Zoe. You are feeling it from first person perspective. When someone copies your brain, Zoe B appears. You can see her from third person perspective, but from first person perspective you will be the "original" Zoe. I hope you understand what I mean here by saying "you".

 

Right, and from her perspective, she will be the "original" Zoë and will feel herself from the first person perspective just as much as I do myself. From her perspective, I'll be the other person.

 

I'll become two separate people. As Zoë A, I'll experience being Zoë A and see Zoë B as just another person, like a twin with a shared history. And as Zoë B, I'll experience being Zoë B and see Zoë A as just another person. They'll both experience being themselves in the first person, and meeting their other self in the second and third person.